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INTRODUCTION
At the 2019 Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”) Annual Meeting,
the panel on Judicial Diversity in Transnational Courts asked, “Why do so few
women serve on transnational courts and tribunals?”1 That line of feminist inquiry
has a long tradition. As Catharine MacKinnon observed, “Feminists have this nasty
habit of counting bodies and refusing not to notice their gender.” 2 Underlying the
panel’s organizing question–and indeed much of feminist jurisprudence–is the belief
that the presence (or absence) of women has consequences in almost any context.
Based on personal and professional experience, we share this foundational
assumption, though we note that the research on whether women judges make a
difference in outcome is equivocal.3
Despite our understanding of the intuitive power of asking for more women, we
do not pursue the panel’s original inquiry. Instead, this essay takes up a second-order
question: why ask why so few women serve on transnational courts and tribunals? If
the reason for posing this question is to strengthen these tribunals in their work of
recognizing and remedying injustice, the question limits the range of potential
solutions. This perspective is informed by our experience with the Feminist
Judgments Projects, an international collaboration of feminist scholars and lawyers
who use feminist reasoning and methods to rewrite judicial opinions.4 The feminist
2
Judicial Diversity in Transnational Courts Session at the 2019 Association of American Law
Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yxzb4arr (the session description in the 2019
AALS Annual Meeting Program asks “Why do so few women and people of color serve on transnational
courts and tribunals?”). This essay focuses in particular on the “woman” part of the question, but the
analysis merits extension to a paucity of people of color on the bench, as well. See infra Part Conclusion.
3
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 35 (1988). The “nasty habit of counting bodies” is an empirical starting
point that one might call asking the “woman question.” Id. Other variations on the “woman question”
include asking how law fails to take into account the experiences and viewpoints of members of
historically disadvantaged groups, or what implications the law has for groups of people based on identity
categories such as sex or gender. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV.
829, 836 (1990) (“One [feminist legal] method, asking the woman question, is designed to expose how
the substance of law may silently and without justification submerge the perspectives of women and other
excluded groups”); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (3d ed. 2013)
(describing asking the “woman question” as a way of “tracing out the gender implications of a social
practice or rule”).
4
Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 603–09 (2003) (providing an overview of research on how
gender, race and political affiliation impact judicial voting). Compare Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of
Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996, (1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (noting that women and
African American male judges were more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff in sex discrimination
cases) with Jennifer Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District
Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 143–44 (2000) (noting that male judges are more sympathetic to
claims involving “gender discrimination sexual harassment, abortion rights and maternity rights, custody
battles and equal pay”).
5
See, e.g., Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J. WOMEN &
L. 1, 4 (2006); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010);
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas et al. eds., 2014);
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M.
Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter US FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST
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judgments methodology demonstrates that judges who apply feminist perspectives–
not judges who claim a particular biology or gender–can make a difference in the
substance and form of judicial opinions. As editors of the U.S. Feminist Judgments
Project, we specifically declined to guide contributors on what we meant by
“feminism.”5 From a personal and professional perspective, though, we understand
feminism as a historical and contemporary movement, related to politics, that
motivates multiple social, legal and other projects seeking women’s equality.6 At the
same time, feminism to us is “a movement and mode of inquiry that has grown to
endorse justice for all people, particularly those historically oppressed or
marginalized by or through law.”7 Our version of “feminism” therefore is not the
unique province of “women,” and we believe that both terms must include multiple
and fluid identities and perspectives.8
Thus, even if tribunals were full of “feminist” judges, they would be applying
feminisms that are sufficiently complex, nuanced and different that even majorityfeminist benches would disagree. For that reason, the overall justice project may be
better served by asking why in transnational courts and tribunals there is so little
diversity of all kinds. Part I of this essay provides an overview of the limitations of
using binary categories like “women” and “men.” Part II reframes the initial question
as part of a broader quest for diversity in decision-making. The essay concludes by
considering further avenues for inquiry.
I.

WHAT IS A WOMAN ANYWAY?

A.

The Definition Problem

The global population is approximately 49.56% female and 50.44% male.9 Most
schoolchildren understand this to mean that half of all humans are girls or women,
and half of all humans are boys or men. But there also are people whose bodies, as
described by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,

JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright, et al. eds.,
2017); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND TE RINO: A TWO-STRANDED ROPE
(Elisabeth McDonald et al. eds., 2017). There are projects under way in Scotland, India, and Mexico, as
well as an International Feminist Judgments project, see SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT,
https://www.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); THE FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT INDIA,
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); E-mail from Trish Luker, Co-Editor,
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, to authors (July 7, 2017, 12:38 AM) (on file with the author)
(describing Mexico Feminist Judgments Project); Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s
Voices in International Law, U. LEICESTER, https://tinyurl.com/y6qm8ef6 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
6
US FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 3–4.
10
Population, female (% of total) and Population, male (% of total), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2017&name_desc=false&start=1960&
view=chart (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (providing estimates for 2017 population based on the United
Nations Population Division’s World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision).
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"do not fit typical binary notions of male or female bodies."10 Intersex individuals
may comprise 0.05% to 1.7% of the population.11
Separate and apart from physical appearance and genetic make-up—typically
called “sex”—are the related classifications of “gender” and “gender identity.”
Gender—the socially constructed expectations for behavior and appearance of
individuals—may or may not correspond to an individual’s sex.12 So, too, gender
identity, or the perception of oneself as male, female, neither or some combination,
may be different from one’s sex or gender.13 And further distinct from all three is
sexual orientation, meaning the sex and/or gender of the individuals one finds
sexually attractive.14
B. Binarism in Biology
There is no universally accepted definition of “woman.” In feminist theory, the
concept has been the subject of much debate, resulting in recognition of the
limitations of various options.15 From a biological perspective, sex can be defined in
terms of one or more attributes of physical appearance, chromosomes, or hormone

11
U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Fact Sheet, Intersex, https://unfe.org/system/unfe65-Intersex_Factsheet_ENGLISH.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (using the term “intersex” to refer to
people “born with sex characteristics [including genitals, gonads and chromosome patterns] that do not
fit typical binary notions of male or female bodies”).
12
Id.; see also Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis,
12 AM. J. OF HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 151–66 (2000) (estimating frequency of births of infants whose bodies
do not fit typical binary sex category as high as 2% of live births); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE
BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 53 (2000) [hereinafter SEXING THE
BODY] (claiming 1 in 60 human births might be of people with intersex characteristics). The study by
Blackless et al. and the work of Fausto-Sterling have been the subject of extensive criticism for use of
outdated terminology. Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, 33
THE SCIENCES 20 (1993) [hereinafter The Five Sexes]. Nevertheless, some intersex groups have embraced
the studies’ figures. See, e.g., How common is intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA,
http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
13
The U.N. World Health Organization defines gender as “the socially constructed characteristics
of women and men–such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It
varies from society to society and can be changed.” Gender, Equity and Human Rights, Gender, U.N.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://tinyurl.com/yyg6g9hw (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). Sex, in
contrast, is the “different biological and physiological characteristics of males and females, such as
reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, etc.” Gender, Equity and Human Rights, Glossary of terms
and tools, U.N. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2011), https://www.who.int/gender-equityrights/knowledge/glossary/en/; see also Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 1187, 1209 (2016) (discussing courts’ confusing use of terms “sex” and “gender”).
14
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
https://tinyurl.com/yd43z59j (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (defining gender identity as a person’s “innermost
concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what
they call themselves. One's gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth”).
15
See id. (defining sexual orientation as “[a]n inherent or immutable enduring emotional, romantic
or sexual attraction to other people”).
16
Paul G. Lannon, Transgender Student Admissions: The Challenge of Defining Gender in A Gender
Fluid World, BOS. B.J. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://bostonbarjournal.com/category/spring-2015-vol-59-2/.
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levels, to give just three possibilities.16 Using even one of these approaches can result
in multiple answers as to an individual’s sex.17
Rules governing international track and field competitions illustrate the
difficulty of determining “sex.” The International Association of Athletics
Federations began to require women to provide a medical certificate of their sex in
order to compete in sanctioned competitions. 18 The International Olympic
Committee adopted mandatory sex testing in 1968.19 But physical examinations can
be inconclusive because an individual may have a large clitoris, a small penis, an
undeveloped or underdeveloped vagina, or undeveloped or underdeveloped testes. 20
Alternately, a person may have unambiguous (or insufficiently ambiguous) genitalia,
but other biological characteristics—i.e., genes— associated with a different sex.
Two decades ago, Anne Fausto-Sterling suggested that there may be five, not
two, sexes. 21 Although the vocabulary she used now seems outdated (at best) or even
hostile (at worst),22 she named and recognized multiple sex classifications to argue
for the end to “corrective” infant genital surgery. 23 Fausto-Sterling asserted that
“[t]he more we look for a simple physical basis for ‘sex,’ the more it becomes clear
that ‘sex’ is not a pure physical category. What bodily signals and functions we
define as male or female come already entangled in our ideas about gender.”24 Both
Fausto-Sterling’s work from decades ago and the possibility of changing one’s

17
JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING
CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2d ed. 1994) (setting forth eight factors that may
contribute to the medical determination of an individual’s “sex”); see also GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE
GUIDE, at 10 (10th ed. 2016), https://perma.cc/Z7PR-C8ZQ (defining sex as “a combination of bodily
characteristics including: chromosomes, hormones, internal and external reproductive organs, and
secondary sex characteristics”). We acknowledge that scientific knowledge and word choices and
definitions are constantly changing, and thus we do not endorse any particular view of how to define
“sex.” We fully expect that any present-day knowledge and terminology will (and should) change in the
future.
18
See, e.g., Matthew Bramble et al., Psychological Effects of Sex Differentiation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF REPRODUCTION 250 (2d ed. 2018) (noting that in utero exposure of a developing fetus to estrogens or
androgens does not necessarily lead to development of external genitalia that corresponds with the
stereotypical “male” or “female” phenotype).
19
See, e.g., Erin Elizabeth Berry, Respect for The Fundamental Notion of Fairness of Competition:
The IAAF, Hyperandrogenism, and Women Athletes, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 207, 210 (2012).
20
Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic
Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT 65, 68–69 (Wayne Wilson & Edward Derse eds., 2001)
(describing implementation of International Olympic Committee’s newly-adopted mandatory testing for
drugs and sex).
21
Lisa Melton, New Perspectives on the Management of Intersex, 357 LANCET 2110, 2110 (2001)
(describing variations in genital appearance).
22
Fausto-Sterling, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at 33.
23
Writing in 1993, Fausto-Sterling used the labels “males,” “females,” “herms” (for
“hermaphrodites”), “merms” (“male pseudo-hermaphrodites”) and “ferms” (“female pseudo
hermaphrodites”). Id. at 21–22. Fausto-Sterling was criticized for this terminology. Eric Vilain et al., We
Used to Call Them Hermaphrodites, 9 GENETICS IN MED. 65–66 (2007); Ruth Padawer, The Humiliating
Practice of Sex-Testing Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 28, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/kbaajcd
(“[t]he word “hermaphrodite” is considered stigmatizing, so physicians and advocates instead use the term
“intersex” or refer to the condition as D.S.D., which stands for either a disorder or a difference of sex
development.”).
24
FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at 78–79.
25
Id. at 4.
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external genitalia (and hormone levels) through gender confirmation surgery 25
demonstrate that physical appearance is hardly the best proxy for sex classification.
From a genetics perspective, biology students learn that females have two X
chromosomes and males have an X and Y chromosome.26 But some people’s genes
do not fall into either category, 27 and some individuals may have “mosaic
genetics.” 28 People with these genetic differences can have the physiology of a
female or a male, or a physiology that does not fit neatly in the binary gender
paradigm.29 A recent scientific study suggests that up to one-third of human genes
operate differently in men and women, and that it is not the X or Y chromosome that
drives such difference. 30 Given this possibility, for legal scholars to limit their
understanding of “women” to persons with only XX chromosomes is contrary to
reality.
Having moved on from physical examinations and genetic testing, international
athletic competitions now favor hormone testing of competitors. Hormone testing
has resulted in few definitive results, instead generating rounds of tests followed by
a series of lawsuits and appeals.31 The process of classifying international athletic
26
See
Gender
Confirmation
Surgeries,
AM.
SOC.
PLASTIC
SURGEONS,
https://www.plasticsurgery.org/reconstructive-procedures/gender-confirmation-surgeries (last visited
Oct. 12, 2019) (describing different surgical options for patients who would like to change their external
appearance to match the gender they feel themselves to be). The American Society of Plastic Surgeons
reported that more than 3, 200 of these procedures were performed in 2016. Alexandra Sifferlin, Gender
Confirmation Surgery is on the Rise in the U.S., TIME (May 22, 2017),
http://time.com/4787914/transgender-gender-confirmation-surgery/ (attributing increase in number of
surgeries to changes in medical care coverage and greater education of doctors and the public about the
need for these surgeries).
27
See Men and Women: The Differences are in the Genes, SCIENCEDAILY.COM (Mar. 23, 2005),
https://tinyurl.com/ydho4rn3 (reporting results of scientific study by Pennsylvania State University
showing significant X-linked gene expression in females).
28
See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 281 (1999) (describing array of variation in chromosomes). Such
chromosomal variation may or may not impact sex development; Padawer, supra note 22.
29
What
Is
Intersex?
INTERSEX
SOCIETY
OF
NORTH
AMERICA,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
30
See generally FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at chapter 3; see also 46, XX
Testicular Disorder of Sex Development, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/46xx-testicular-disorder-of-sex-development.
31
See Moran Gershoni & Shmuel Pietrokovski, The Landscape of Sex-Differential Transcriptome
and its Consequent Selection in Human Adults, 15 BMC BIOLOGY 1 (2017) (reporting results of RNAsequencing from 544 adults); Jenny Graves, Not Just About Sex: Throughout Our Bodies, Thousands of
Genes Act Differently in Men and Women, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y594tnyq (elaborating on implications of study by Gershone & Petrokovski).
32
In 2014, officials barred Indian sprinter Dutee Chand from track competition when testing
revealed that her body contains elevated levels of androgens (male sex hormones like testosterone). Chand
v. Athletics Federation of India, CAS 2014/A/3759 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport 2015). International attention
continues to focus on South African middle-distance runner and two-time Olympic champion Caster
Semenya. Katrina Karkazis & Rebecca Jordan-Young, The Treatment of Caster Semenya Shows Athletics’
Bias Against Women of Color, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y8z29k82; see
also Jeré Longman, Track’s New Gender Rules Could Exclude Some Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
25, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y3odj5wy (describing the alternatives for athletes who refuse to artificially
lower their testosterone levels as entering competitions for men, entering competitions for intersex
athletes, if any exist, changing distance specialties or not participating in elite competitions). In May 2019,
the Court for Arbitration in Sport rejected Semenya’s appeal of the regulations promulgated by the
International Association of Athletics Federations that would require her to take medication to suppress
her natural levels of testosterone, if Semenya wishes to compete in middle-distance at IAAF-sanctioned
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competitors as “male” or “female” reveals the exercise of power that is involved in
defining who is a woman or a man—no matter what the context.32 First, a governing
body must decide how sex will be determined. Then, someone must physically test
the candidates to assign them to categories. Finally, someone must police the
category boundaries.
In addition to biological complexity, the number of people identifying as neither
male nor female is increasing rapidly. A 2017 poll by the Harris group found that
12% of people aged 18-34 self-identify as other than cisgender.33 A similar survey
by the National Center for Transgender Equality showed that the respondents who
identified as transgender wrote in more than 500 unique gender terms with which
they identified, including non-binary, multi-gender, bigender and agender. 34
Moreover, as Heath Fogg Davis notes, these are studies of people who identify as
transgender, which means that the numbers within the general population are likely
higher.35 Dr. Diane Erehnsaft calls the expanding number of persons identifying as
transgender, gender fluid or genderqueer a “new gender revolution. It's erased boxes
and created gender infinity instead.”36
C. Binarism in Law and Culture
Similar to scientific ideas about sex and gender, the law’s treatment of sex and
gender is on a collision course with reality. For the most part, the law operates as if
gender were “a fixed phenomenon that derives naturally from an individual's
biological sex.”37 One commentator notes that “it is almost ludicrous to maintain that
sex discrimination, sexual identification, or sexual identity takes place on the level
of biology or genitals. Yet the law continues to insist that they do.”38
For example, Title VII has been slow to protect sexual minorities, particularly
transgender people and people whose gender expression does not fit the binary of
male/female. Ann McGinley observes that “[t]he problem of adequately protecting
sexual minorities under Title VII lies in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a
view that identifies men and women as polar opposites and that sees gender as
naturally flowing from biological sex.” 39 Anti-discrimination law can handle
discrimination when it fits neatly into traditional categories. Behavior or identity
events. Hailey Middlebrook, Court Rules Against Caster Semenya in IAAF Testosterone Case, RUNNERS
WORLD (May 1, 2019), https://www.runnersworld.com/news/a27332526/caster-semenya-court-ruling
(explaining ruling and its negative impact on Semenya’s ability to compete in prestigious international
competitions).
33
This idea borrows from Foucault’s notion of the legal subject. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE
DE SYSTÈMES DE PENSÉE, ANÉE 1980-1981 (1981) (Fr.); see also HEATH FOGG DAVIS, BEYOND TRANS:
DOES GENDER MATTER? 10–11 (2017) (“The administrative discretion to decide who is female and who
is male is the essence of sex identity discrimination…[and] a specific subcategory of sexism.”).
34
GLAAD,
ACCELERATING
ACCEPTANCE
4
(2017),
https://www.glaad.org/publications/accelerating-acceptance-2017.
35
SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 40 (2016).
36
DAVIS, supra note 33, at 11.
37
Jon Brooks, Boy? Girl? Both? Neither? A New Generation Overthrows Gender, KQED SCIENCE
(April 24, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y9utnq2c.
38
Id.
39
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: Disaggregating Sex from
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 40 (1995).
40
Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715 (2010).
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outside this norm presents a situation similar to what Catharine MacKinnon called a
“paradigm trauma” that creates a “crisis time for the doctrine.”40
The problem of defining “woman” in legal and cultural settings is elucidated by
several examples. For example, in Corbett v. Corbett,41 the court heard “extensive
testimony from psychiatrists, gynecologists, endocrinologists, physicians, and stateappointed sexual organ inspectors” 42 to attempt to discern whether April Ashley
Corbett, a transgender woman, was actually a “woman” for purposes of UK divorce
law.43 Ashley Corbett had male chromosomes and had been born with male genitalia,
but after surgery had female hormone levels and “remarkably good” female
genitals. 44 She fully identified as a woman and presented so convincingly as a
woman that the court noted her remarkably compelling “pastiche of femininity.”45
Nevertheless, the court disregarded this evidence as well as Ashley Corbett’s own
testimony and concluded she was male, relying mainly on her chromosomes and
genitals.46 The court therefore granted Arthur Corbett’s petition for divorce, on the
grounds that the marriage had been void ab initio because Ashley Corbett was a
“man,” and same-sex marriage was not possible under UK law at the time.47
The cultural battle over single-sex bathrooms is another example of the
difficulties in defining certain identity categories.48 Ruth Colker notes that signs on
sex-segregated restrooms rely on stereotypes, yet “few women probably recognize
themselves as a stick figure wearing a triangle dress or skirt.” 49 Decades before the
issue erupted in North Carolina, 50 Colker worked at a university where only the
men’s bathroom had showers, so her employer furnished her with a “woman in
shower” placard to place on the entrance to the men’s room when she wished to
shower. This caused her some tongue-in-cheek “gender confusion” because her

41

MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 36.
Corbett v. Corbett [1970] All ER 33 (Fam).
43
Id. It is difficult to imagine what a sexual organ inspector is, how someone would qualify to be
one, and what kind of intrusive process is involved in submitting to such an inspection.
44
Id. (discussed in Franke, supra note 39, at 45).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
For a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between sex-segregated bathrooms and equality,
see Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's Room, 74 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1655 (2007); Mary Anne
Case, Changing Room? A Quick Tour of Men's and Women's Restrooms in U.S. Law over the Last Decade,
from the U.S. Constitution to Local Ordinances, 13 PUB. CULTURE 333 (2000).
50
Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms, Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 150 n.30 (2017)
(describing results of image search for male and female restrooms, noting that the male figures always
have long trousers). But, see #ItWasNeverADress, https://itwasneveradress.com (last visited Oct. 12,
2019) (reimagining the triangle dress a superhero’s cape).
51
See, e.g., Amber Phillips, The Tumultuous History of North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill, Which is
On Its Way to Repeal, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 30, 2017) (providing overview of controversy that
followed the February, 2016 passage by the Charlotte City Council of a law that would prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations against gay or transgender customers),
https://tinyurl.com/y2q3gq3l; Camila Domonoske, North Carolina Repeals Portions of Controversial
“Bathroom Bill,” NPR. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y2zh9c52 (describing prohibition until 2020
on local jurisdictions from passing laws that would protect LGBT people).
42
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gender was “different” depending on the purpose for which she was using the facility
(male to shower, female to use the toilet).51
Similarly, Patricia Williams wrote in the late 1980s of the experience of a trans
woman law student who was not permitted by other students to use either the male
or female bathrooms. 52 The student approached Williams because the student’s
failure to fit within the gender binary rendered her a “nobody” when it came to using
a bathroom.53 Non-binary people report similar problems even of self-policing: if
there are only men’s and women’s rooms, which does a person choose, if the person
identifies as neither?54
The reactions of some feminists to the “paradigm trauma” of who-counts-as-awoman provide further examples. The Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival for years
banned trans women based on its “festival for womyn-born womyn” policy.55 This
policy led to a boycott by state and national equality groups in 2014; the festival
elected to shut down rather than allow trans women to attend the festival.56 In the
North Carolina bathroom controversy, some feminists have aligned with the
fundamentalist Christians in backing the law requiring strict sex-segregated
bathrooms.57
Many women’s colleges have struggled to define who is a “woman.” Compare
Mount Holyoke’s policy, which allows admission to any student who “is female or
who identifies as a woman” (which appears to include anyone except for someone
who is “born male and identifies as a man”) with Smith College, which does not
permit applications from trans men (or anyone identifying as male) or students who
are gender non-binary.58 Smith College relies entirely on admissions material to
make its judgment about gender, but both Wellesley and Bryn Mawr require
information beyond the admissions material.59 Wellesley College “will consider for
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Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 47–48
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53
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L. REV. 2128, 2144–46 (1989).
54
Id.
55
Brooks, supra note 37.
56
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(Aug. 14, 2014, 10:15 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y4e4u5fp.
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2015,
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See, e.g., Kaeley Triller Haver, A Rape Survivor Speaks Out Against Transgender Bathrooms,
THE FEDERALIST, (Nov. 23, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/11/23/a-rape-survivor-speaks-outabout-transgender-bathrooms/ (arguing that men will take advantage of bathroom sex desegregation to
sexually assault women); Fr. Mark Hodges, Proposed Bathroom Bill Will Keep ‘Transgender’ Men Out
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LIFE
SITE,
(Jan.
9,
2017,
10:47
PM)
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/public-reacts-to-texas-proposed-bathroom-privacy-law-with-praiseprotests (describing need for the “Women's Privacy Act” to protect women's privacy while using a
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Compare Admission of Transgender Students, MOUNT HOLYOKE, https://tinyurl.com/yy24nws7;
with Gender Identity & Expression, SMITH COLLEGE, https://tinyurl.com/y3n2xwkh. For a discussion of
the category dilemma raised by single sex educational institutions, see Davis, supra note 33, at 85–86
(discussing the case of Calliope Wong, a transgender woman denied admission to Smith College).
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See Lannon supra, note 16 (calling the decision to probe beyond admissions material
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admission any applicant who lives as a woman and consistently identifies as
a woman,” a definition that excludes trans men and some others who are outside the
binary. 60 Bryn Mawr's policy is open to transgender and intersex individuals, but
only if they “live and identify as women at the time of application,” and trans men,
as long as they have not taken “medical or legal steps to identify as male.” 61
D. Binarism in the Twenty-First Century
The twenty-first century has brought increased visibility of gender fluidity,62
making the term “woman” seem anachronistic in some contexts. Although the terms
“men” and “women” likely still function as cognitive or linguistic shorthand for more
nuanced understandings of the terms,63 framing any policy discussion in terms of
“men” and “women” will fail to account for biological variety, individual difference,
diverse gender identity, multiple sexual orientations, and the significant role that
society plays in constructing these identifiers. To ask, “Where are the women?” (as
one of us has done frequently and publicly) 64 is, upon critical reflection, to risk
converting persons who do not fit into the binary into “unnatural outcasts.”65
If the global culture is starting to move away from binary thinking about sex,
then feminist legal scholars should do the same. Legal scholars who believe in the
value of diverse perspectives on the bench should support methods that “erase
boxes” 66 and reconfigure the “woman question.” 67 As already discussed, the
question of “women” on the courts raises myriad definitional issues. While feminists
may agree that greater diversity on the bench is necessary for political legitimacy, as
Sally Kenney argues,68 counting “women” is complicated.69 Moreover, if feminists
agree that society constructs the meaning of both sex and gender,70 then the feminist
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Mission and Gender Policy, WELLESLEY COLLEGE, https://www.wellesley.edu/news/gender-
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64
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(Aug.
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(Apr.
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175 (2012).
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project must reconfigure the details of its “nasty habit of counting bodies and
refusing not to notice their gender.”71 Without more fully considering these concepts,
the inquiry is intellectually and politically precarious.72
To reframe the question, we need to better understand the purpose of asking for
more “women” on the courts. The goal may be to have more judges who look like
women so that more individuals in our society will be able to see themselves on the
bench.73 But that purpose might require appearance- and presentation-policing that
many feminists can and should reject.74
For other feminists, asking for more women on the bench might be shorthand
for seeking judges who are sensitive to “women’s issues” or “women’s lived
experiences.” But the newcomers most likely to be placed on tribunals and in courts
will be women who most closely resemble—and are least threatening to—those in
power.75
Rather than the question posed to this panel, we take up Mari Matsuda’s
invitation to ask the “other question,” taking into account the interconnectedness of
all subordination.76 With an expansive view of feminism, one can ask how a judge’s
lived experience, identity, and perspective inform decision-making. Increasing
diversity on the bench might correlate to diversity in sex, gender, gender identity, or
sexual orientation, but it ought not be confined to those qualities. What might courts
and tribunals look like if more judges had lived in poverty; grew up in rural areas;
suffered discrimination based on gender, race, religion, nationality, or disability;
lived in fear of group-based violence; or otherwise struggled because of a
marginalized position in society?
II.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE(S)

Suggesting that the effects of unrepresentative courts and unequal justice will
be alleviated by appointing more women to the bench is rooted in the kind of binary
thinking that has long entangled women. This solution evades the real problem that
feminist legal scholars presumably want to solve: the lack of diverse perspectives on
the bench. As Katherine Franke describes the problem:
Defining sex in biological or anatomical terms represents a serious error that
fails to account for the complex behavioral aspects of sexual identity. In so
72

MACKINNON, supra note 2.
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 10.
74
KENNEY, supra note 69 at 56–58, n.84 (recognizing the “role model” argument).
75
See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank and Trust, 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing that this is
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is through a method I call ‘ask the other question.’ When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where
is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in
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doing, this definition elides the degree to which most, if not all, differences
between men and women are grounded not in biology, but in gender
normativity.77
Feminist theory’s attempts to define “woman” have been riddled by essentialism
and stereotyping. A prominent example occurred in the 1980s, largely due to the
success of Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice, when feminist theory exploded
with theories of women’s relational nature and “connectedness.” Scholar Suzanna
Sherry summarized the claimed essential difference: “the basic feminine sense of
self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is separate.” This
difference suggested that due to factors including pregnancy, child-rearing
responsibilities, menstruation, and intercourse, “women have a ‘sense’ of existential
‘connection’ to other human life which men do not.” 78 That many people who
identified as women did not experience any of these physical connections did nothing
to stop the wave of scholarship on women’s “different” voice. 79
Feminists used Carol Gilligan’s sociological data to reach wide-ranging
conclusions. Among them were that women’s “special” sense of connection created
“a way of learning, a path of moral development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of
the world and of one’s place within it which sharply contrasts with men’s.”80 And
some feminist legal scholars generated an entire scholarly oeuvre about how
women’s “ethic of care” could change the law, legal education, legal practice, and
judging.81
The “connection” theory of womanhood has been roundly critiqued, 82 but
vestiges remain. Consider, for example, a speech by Baroness Hale, the first woman
in the House of Lords; she resists the notion that women judges are “different” and
likely to make “different decisions” from their male counterparts.83 At the same time,
she elevates the importance of stereotypically female work such as changing diapers
and cooking meals for children: “I would like to think that a wider experience of the
world is helpful: knowing a little about bearing and bringing up children must make
some difference.”84
Similarly emphasizing the presumed difference of women and girls, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in Safford v. Redding,
where the U.S. Supreme Court found that a school’s strip search of a 13-year old
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female student violated her Fourth Amendment rights.85 News reports said the case
“revealed a gender fault line at the court,” because Justice Ginsburg said that her
(then all-male) colleagues “have never been a 13-year-old girl. It’s a very sensitive
age for a girl. I don’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood.” 86
Questions by the male Justices during oral argument seemed to imply that requiring
a 13-year-old girl to strip down to her underwear is not traumatic because it is akin
to a bathing suit or like changing for gym class. 87
Ginsburg’s comments have been frequently cited as evidence for the need for
more women on the bench to understand the perspectives of the women and young
girls.88 But if instead of asking the “woman question” Ginsburg had asked the “other
question,” she might have reached the conclusion that a 13-year-old boy would be
equally embarrassed, shy, and traumatized, by being strip searched by school
administrators. 89 As masculinities scholars have pointed out, the male cultural
imperative requires even young teenagers to “man up” and accept bodily indignities
when they resemble typical “locker room” scenarios.90
A different strand of feminist theory, one that examines women in terms of their
structural and interpersonal subordination to men,91 avoids the “woman as caregiver”
trap but has other weaknesses. Under anti-subordination theory, what women have
in common is a shared experience of being devalued as women.92 Patriarchy, and
women’s position in it, is maintained through a set of purportedly neutral, objective
standards of merit that mask the masculine ideal. 93 Constant threats of sexual
violence against women, pornography and harassment, and the devaluation of
characteristics associated with women buttress the system of subordination. 94 In a
patriarchal society, “women” are those who occupy the lowest rung.
Many feminist scholars disagree that anti-subordination theory describes all
“women’s” experiences, pointing out that women have multiple types of oppressions
86
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to resist, and so it is not appropriate to create some sort of hierarchy, putting sexism
before any other concerns.95 Angela Harris has emphasized that it is inaccurate to
combine all women’s experiences into one “devaluation,” as the experiences of poor
women and women of color are qualitatively different from those of many white
women. 96 Similarly, several lesbian feminist theorists have distanced themselves
from the description of women’s experiences as always those of subordination,
giving as examples their contrasting experiences with pornography 97 and their
experience of escaping patriarchy in their romantic and sexual lives. 98 Still other
women, like the rural Pennsylvania woman quoted at the beginning of this essay,
reject the idea that they are subordinated at all. And, to be sure, the emphasis of antisubordination feminist theory on women’s experiences under patriarchy can also
sometimes transform into devaluation of the experiences of trans, lesbian, gay or
other gender-non-conforming people.99
These critiques serve as a reminder to avoid essentialist pitfalls when talking
about the need for more “women” on courts and tribunals. Chief among these pitfalls
is the assumption that “women” judges will transform the institutions they serve
simply because they are women. As Rosemary Hunter writes: “Why did we think
that women would transform institutions without simultaneously—or alternatively—
being transformed by them? Why did we believe that women appointed to positions
of power would be ‘representative’ of women as a group, rather than being those
who most resemble the traditional incumbents and are thus considered least likely to
disturb the status quo?”100 Catharine MacKinnon has long observed that the women
who benefit from feminism’s emphasis on formal equality are “mostly women who
have been able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm
. . .. They are the qualified, the least of sex discrimination’s victims.” 101
This factor is multiplied because the system of judicial appointment is marked
by bias and elitism. Deborah Rhode calls this the “misleading myth of meritocracy,”
the dangerous and false idea that opportunity and advancement result from a system
untainted by bias.102 Sally Kenney recounts her frustration that whenever she talks
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about women on the bench, she is urged to modify “women” with the word “wellqualified,” as if her goal is to populate the bench with unqualified women.103
Federal judges, for example, tend to be chosen from prestigious clerkships and
big corporate law firms, two professional enclaves that tend to favor white, wealthy
and male candidates.104 The more than 1300 sitting federal judges overwhelmingly
attended Harvard (140 judges) and other elite law schools. 105 These elite law
schools–including Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Berkeley, NYU–tend to skew white
and wealthy.106 Indeed, every step leading up to that first appointment to the bench–
from academic indicators to standardized testing and beyond–embeds race, class and
gender bias.107
While calling for more “women” in the judiciary may yield a short-term gain,
the real work lies in broadening the definition of who is “qualified” to be a judge.
That requires open acknowledgment of the biases inherent in the admissions
processes that lead to judicial positions: elite law schools, clerkships, prestigious law
firms and other gate-keepers. Otherwise, the effort will yield only female judges who
“are able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm.” 108
Getting a different result requires us to ask a different question.109
CONCLUSION
When we argue that the panel’s inquiry should be reframed, we must remember
that women and men from populations underrepresented in the law—for example,
people of color, people who grew up poor—may not be eager to join a campaign (or
even attend an AALS program) focused on “more women.” According to Kimberlé
Crenshaw, many Black women continue to be ambivalent “about the degree of
political and social capital that ought to be expended toward challenging gender
104
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barriers, particularly when the challenges might conflict with the antiracism
agenda.”110
As the distant and recent past indicates, white women have a history of choosing
their racial privilege over solidarity with poor women or women of color.111 The
2018 midterm elections illustrate this point. Stacey Abrams, an African-American
woman running for governor in Georgia against a white man, garnered only 25% of
the white female vote.112 A white woman, Cindy Hyde-Smith, won a Mississippi
Senate seat running against an African-American man, even after making racially
charged jokes about voter suppression, saying she would be on the “front row” if a
supporter invited her to a public hanging and posing in a Confederate cap.113 Ms.
Hyde-Smith is the first female senator from Mississippi because white women
supported her,114 but her election is hardly a victory for the broader social justice
project.
If elite white women are the ones who will benefit from a call for more “women”
judges, it is imperative to reframe the question. Instead of asking for more women,
we should clearly call, as Kimberlé Crenshaw urged almost two decades ago, for the
elevation of women who have the least professional capital. Crenshaw relates the
story of nineteenth century feminist Anna Julia Cooper. After a community leader
claimed that wherever he entered, the Black race entered with him, Cooper observed,
"Only the Black Woman can say, when and where I enter . . . then and there the
whole Negro race enters with me."115 Cooper’s story reinforces the message that
efforts to elevate the “qualified . . . the least of sex discrimination’s victims,” will
mean that only elite women will advance. Feminists would be better served by a
focus on those most hurt by discrimination. As Mari Matsuda frames it, “dismantling
any one form of subordination is impossible without dismantling every other . . .
particularly in the women of color movement, the answer is that no person is free
until the last and the least of us is free.”116 Truly, all will enter with the elevation of
women who are multiply-burdened by not only sex discrimination but also

111
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 161 (1989); see also Danielle Young, Tarana Burke Explains Why Black Women Don’t Think
#MeToo is For Them, ESSENCE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.essence.com/videos/tarana-burke-explainswhy-black-women-dont-think-metoo-is-for-them/; Tamela J. Gordon, Why I’m Giving Up on
Intersectional Feminism, QUARTZY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://qz.com/quartzy/1265902/why-im-giving-upon-intersectional-feminism/ (“I know what sisterhood is and I know what white women think sisterhood
is; they got it all wrong.”).
112
See, e.g., Treva B. Lindsey, The Betrayal of White Women Voters: In Pivotal State Races, They
Still Backed the GOP, VOX (Nov. 9, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/firstperson/2018/11/9/18075390/election-2018-midterms-white-women-voters (reporting that, nationally,
black women voted 92% for progressive candidates, but 49% of white women voted Republican).
113
Id.
114
Emily Wagster Pettus, There Was No Ill Will, No Intent Whatsoever: Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith
Apologizes After Controversial ‘Public Hanging’ Remark, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2018, 11:05 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/cindy-hyde-smith-apologizes-after-public-hanging-remarkmississippi-2018-11 (quoting the candidate as saying, “For anyone that was offended by my comments, I
certainly apologize. There was no ill will, no intent whatsoever in my statement”).
115
Id.
116
Crenshaw, supra note 111, at 160 (quoting Cooper).
117
Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1189.

2019]

WHY WOMEN?

334

discrimination based on race, class, disability, immigration status, gender identity,
sexuality or other personal identities beyond biological sex.
This essay has challenged the foundational question of the panel but proceeds
from the belief that feminist legal theorists share a commitment to facilitating entry
for all women to enter, not just privileged white women, and not white women first.
The last of these beliefs may be unfounded or even controversial. After all, the
experience of human nature is that one naturally pushes for changes or reforms that
will benefit oneself.117 Yet our version of feminism is broad. We conceive of it as a
project that wants equality and advancement for not only women but for all
historically disadvantaged groups. And “women” must be understood to mean
women in all of their complexities, with all of their multiple identities.
Calling for more “women” is easy. Achieving true diversity is harder.
Let’s begin.

118
But see, Dylan M. Smith et al., A New View of Utility: Maximizing “Optimal Investment,” in
MOVING BEYOND SELF-INTEREST: PERSPECTIVES FROM EVOLUTIONAL BIOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE, AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 239 (Stephanie L. Brown et al. eds., 2012) (explaining and then questioning basic
assumption of economics that “if given freedom of choice, people will generally act rationally to promote
their own self-interest”).

